Designers need a way to overcome information related risks, including information leakage and misuse from their own collaborators during a collaborative product realization process. Existing cryptographic techniques aimed at overcoming these information related risks are computationally expensive and slow even for moderate problem sizes, and legal approaches (e.g., the use of non-disclosure agreements) are not effective. The computational practicality problem is particularly pronounced for simulation computations like finite element analysis (FEA), that involve both a geometric partitioning (meshing) and computations of cubic time complexity. In this paper, we propose a technological approach that enables designers to perform simulations, such as FEA computations, without the need for revealing their information to anyone, including their design collaborators. We demonstrate our approach using secure finite element analysis (sFEA) which enables designers to perform FEA without having to reveal structural/material information to their counterparts even though the computed answer depends on all the collaborators' confidential information. We build sFEA using computationally efficient protocols implementing a secure co-design framework. One of our findings is that the most natural implementations of sFEA, using existing protocols, suffer from limited scalability. To overcome these limitations, we propose strategies that help improve the scalability of sFEA. We document and discuss the experiments we conducted to determine the computational overhead imposed by sFEA. The results indicate that the computational burden imposed by sFEA makes it challenging for large-scale FEA -our scheme significantly increases the problem sizes that can be handled when compared to implementations us- * Corresponding author: schaduvu@purdue.edu ing previous algorithms and protocols, but large enough problem sizes will swamp our scheme as well (in some sense this is unavoidable because of the cubic nature of the FEA time complexity). This work is another step towards opening up new avenues for improving the way information is exchanged in collaborative simulation computations such as FEA.
control the use of their confidential information during and after interacting with their current and prospective collaborators, especially when the collaborators are current or future competitors.
Designers would greatly benefit from ways to enabling the safe use of their information by collaborators, i.e., in a way that can help them perform design functions while preventing any future misuse of the sensitive information. Cryptographic techniques including homomorphic encryption [6, 7] and garbled circuits [8] can be used to protect information from such internal collaborators. However, these are ill-suited for design computations such as sFEA, which are computationally intensive and iterative in nature. Moreover, these technologies require an efficient management of encryption and decryption keys. Legal approaches such as non-disclosure agreements can be deployed to protect the information, but these approaches require considerable expense and effort to detect violations, gather evidence, and sue in court. This need motivated us to investigate how designers can best perform design computations securely in a codesign setting. This paper is a step towards answering this research question. We propose an approach that enables designers to perform Finite Element Analysis (FEA) securely without the need for them to reveal their individual confidential information to anyone, including their design collaborators. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the FEA problem is being addressed in such a security setting. We believe that further research in this direction can help designers preserve confidential information while performing engineering analysis securely.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the state-of-the-art security solutions proposed for different stages of design, and points out the gap in research in secure simulation studies. Section 3 discusses secure finite element analysis (sFEA), which enables designers to perform the computations involved in finite element analysis securely. Section 4 presents different implementation strategies of the proposed sFEA. Section 5 discusses the scalability challenges of the proposed sFEA. Finally, closing comments are presented in Section 6.
Literature Review
Activities in a design collaboration can range from the generation and assembly of 3D models to joint analysis of the system and manufacturing. Prevention of information leakage while performing such design functions has become an important research topic in collaborative product realization. Researchers from different domains have proposed targeted solutions that suit different stages of the product design process.
Chang et al. [9] proposed a secure way of storing confidential engineering drawings from leakage to a competitor through a collaborator. For 3D model creation, Elseh and Hamza [10] introduced the use of secret sharing approaches in 3D CAD models to protect the confidential information involved. Martin Del Ray [11] proposed a new secret sharing approach for 3D solid models based on cellular automata. Unlike the former approaches, this approach can be used to hide multiple secrets within the same 3D model.
Researchers have proposed a plethora of techniques based on access control [12, 4, 13] . Of these techniques, the attributes of the 3D model such as features, multi-resolution, and the file containing the 3D model itself, are some of the popular ways of introducing access control into the design process. Different authentication techniques including encryption and digital certificates are used in access control [14, 15, 16] . All these approaches allow designers to overcome unauthorized edits and protect access to sensitive information. However, fundamentally these approaches either completely reveal or completely hide information from collaborators, depending on whether access is authorized or not. This implies that a collaborator cannot compute answers that depend on information to which access is not authorized for this collaborator, even when the computed answer would reveal very little about the information to which access is not authorized. In short, access control allows computations only if the information is accessible. Computations over inaccessible information is not possible. Such extreme handling of confidential information may not be suitable for all kinds of design functions such as compatibility-related computations.
In the case of 3D model assembly, sensitive information is suppressed by deforming the 3D model, or simply hidden from the collaborators [17, 18] . Cai et al. [19] proposed an encryption scheme that uses a mix of size scaling and deformation of 3D sketches to hide sensitive information.
The approach of this paper towards the handling of sensitive information while performing collaborative FEA engineering simulations, is to carry out the collaborative simulation computations without revealing to any of the collaborators the confidential information of other collaborators, even though the cooperatively computed answers depend on the confidential inputs of all the collaborators. This approach builds on Secure Arithmetic and logical oPerations using Additive Splits (SAPAS) protocols proposed by Wang et al. [20] . Chaduvula et al. [21] proposed a secure co-design (SCD) framework that allows designers to deploy SAPAS protocols in different co-design scenarios. To the best of our knowledge no prior FEA related work achieves this, nor does it follow from the straightforward use of exiting prior results in secure multi-party computation (at least not in a practical sense). In the following section, we explain the procedure to achieve secure finite element analysis in the above-mentioned SCD framework.
Approach for Secure Finite Element Analysis
sFEA is a collaborative computation technique that enables designers to perform FEA without the need for revealing confidential inputs/outputs by individual designers to anyone, including their partner designers. sFEA is developed by building on the secure co-design framework [21] that uses SAPAS protocols [20] as building blocks.
Secure Co-Design Framework for sFEA
The secure Co-Design (SCD) framework consists of a codesign model, security model, an adversarial model, and a secure co-design process. In this section, we discuss these in the context of FEA.
Co-design Model
In the co-design model, we assume that two designers, Alice, a structural designer, and Bob, a material designer, are mutually interested in conducting FEA on a product resulting from their individual designs. In this co-design setting, Alice owns the input information related to the product's application such as dimensions (L x ,L y ) and forces (f x ,f y ). Bob owns the information on the material properties such as Young's modulus (E) and Poisson's ratio (ν). The resulting nodal displacements from FEA help Alice in determining the resulting strains, whereas Bob is interested in learning whether the material is adequate for the application or not, which can be learned from the factor of safety. In this paper, we consider a co-design scenario involving the design of a 2D plate, as shown in Figure 1 . 
Security Model
In this co-design setting, Alice and Bob do not want to reveal their confidential input and output information to anyone, i.e. Alice does not want to share information on the forces (f x ,f y ), and the geometry of the plate (L x ,L y ). On the other hand, Bob does not want to share information on the material properties including stress-strain relationship (denoted by matrix D).
The number of confidential parameters owned by Alice and Bob depends on the mesh element and mesh geometry. For each individual mesh element, Alice owns the geometry of the mesh element and forces associated with the nodes of the element. Bob can choose different materials for each individual element. Hence, in the case of an isotropic material, Bob has two confidential parameters: Young's modulus (E) and Poisson's ratio (ν). For non-isotropic tailor-made materials the number of confidential parameters can be significantly greater than two. Materials designer can selectively tailor material properties throughout the geometry. Such materials are achievable using layered manufacturing.
The confidential inputs from Alice are the straindisplacement relationship matrix (B) for each individual element and the associated nodal forces. Bob owns information on the stress-strain relationship matrix (D). Together, they want to determine the displacement vector (u = [U 2x ,U 2y ,U 3x ,U 3y ,U 4y ]). The ownership of inputs in this co-design setting is summarized in Table 1 . In this co-design setting, the non-confidential parameters are the number of mesh elements and the connection between different mesh elements. Alice chooses the mesh element, mesh geometry, and the number of mesh elements on the basis of the application. Using these, Alice derives the connectivity matrix (C). In this problem formulation, we assume that Alice shares C, the number of mesh elements (n e ) and the boundary condition (b = [U 1x = 0,U 1y = 0,U 4x = 0]) with Bob. This helps Alice and Bob to learn about how the stiffness matrices of individual mesh elements are to be assembled to form the global stiffness matrix (K). In other words, both Alice and Bob are aware of the structure of global stiffness matrix (K).
In FEA analysis, mesh configuration is important. Mesh configuration includes choice of the mesh element and mesh structure (including density, dimensions of each mesh), which can impact the accuracy of displacements. However, revealing the mesh structure can lead to inferences on the load conditions. Therefore, in this problem formulation, Alice openly shares only the connectivity matrix (C) with Bob. Mesh structure cannot be inferred by revealing the connectivity matrix (C).
This form of problem formulation allows Alice to choose a mesh configuration while preserving the confidentiality of the load conditions (f x ,f y ) and geometry of the plate (L x ,L y ). For instance, Alice can increase the number of mesh elements where the forces are larger. Revealing the connectivity matrix (C) to Bob reveals the number of mesh elements, the number of nodes in a given element, and the total number of nodes (n n ). A few possible configurations for a particular connectivity matrix (C) are shown in Figure 2 . From this discussion, we conclude that Bob cannot directly infer on Alice's confidential parameters (B,f x ,f y ) from the connectivity matrix (C).
Adversarial Model
The SCD framework uses at least one external server (denoted by H) to perform the desired computations. The novelty of this framework is that the designers (Alice and Bob) need not reveal any confidential information to H. In the SCD framework, it is assumed that Alice, Bob, and the server are honest but curious. They are honest in the sense that they obey the steps involved in exchanging data with other designers. However, they are curious in the sense that a designer/server can attempt to infer another designer's confidential inputs/outputs. This framework also assumes that there is no collusion between the designers and server.
Secure Co-design Process
As part of the FEA analysis, Alice and Bob are interested in solving Ku = f and determining the displacement vector u. The global stiffness matrix K is determined using Alice's input (B), and Bob's input (D). The FEA algorithm used to compute K and determine u is shown in Table 2 .
All the computations involved in this FEA algorithm are executed using Secure Arithmetic and logical oPerations using Additive Splits (SAPAS) protocols [20] . Our new implementation fixes a weakness in the multiplication protocol (MP) of SAPAS, that caused it to leak information when one of the multiplicands is zero. We refer to this as multiplication and division protocol (MDP) in the rest of this paper. Figure 3 demonstrates the construction of higher level matrix computations using SAPAS protocols. Next, we briefly discuss the steps involved in the secure co-design process. Figure 3 illustrates the use of different SAPAS protocols with Alice's inputs to construct higher level matrix computations in the FEA algorithm. At the end of this step, both Alice and Bob obtain additive splits of u.
6. Share additive splits of outputs: Alice and Bob exchange the additive splits of u received in Step 5 with each other. 7. Determine desired outputs: Both Alice and Bob determine (u) by adding the splits received in Steps 5 and 6 i.e., u = u 1 + u 2 .
In this particular problem formulation, we assumed that Alice and Bob are interested in determining the same output (u). However, the flexibility in sFEA allows Alice and Bob to determine different outputs. For example, Alice can determine the maximum strain and Bob can determine the factor of safety simultaneously without revealing their confidential inputs.
Correctness of sFEA
The correctness proofs of the individual SAPAS protocols (refer Figure 3) used in the sFEA technique can be found in [20] .
For the problem described in Section 3. 
Security of sFEA
As all the computations are performed using SAPAS protocols, Alice and Bob have only a split each of the actual computation result. Therefore, neither Alice nor Bob can determine the confidential information owned by their counterpart in the intermediate steps. At the end of the sFEA, the additive splits corresponding to the displacements are mutually shared.
The tractability between the confidential parameters (B,D) and displacement vector (u) decreases with an increase in the number of mesh elements. For instance, let us consider an extreme case, where Alice chooses a single quadrilateral element for the entire 2D plate. In such a case, the relationship between the forces and displacements narrows down to: B T DBu = f. This equation can result in two possible solutions: one for an isotropic material and other one for a non-isotropic material. As the number of mesh elements (n e ) increases, the number of unknown parameters increases exponentially (for instance, 2 n e in the case of isotropic material). initialize L ← as (n,n) matrix Moreover, sFEA needs Alice and Bob to mutually agree on the computations upfront. This allows Bob to understand and access the risks involved while participating in a FEA simulation. For instance, in the case where Alice chooses a single element for the entire plate, Bob can learn about it from the connectivity matrix (C) which is shared before the start of the sFEA algorithm. With this information, Bob may propose alternatives such as revealing only the maximum displacement instead of the entire displacement vector u or may choose not to participate.
sFEA is aimed at preserving confidentiality and preventing leakage of information through a collaborator. It can be integrated with techniques such as access control, anonymizing techniques, and HTTPS to protect it from attack by entities external to the collaboration. Such integration augments the level of data security. However, this aspect is out of the scope of the current work. Next, we discuss the performance of the proposed sFEA. 
Computationally Lightweight Nature of sFEA
The set of SAPAS protocols belong to a class of cryptographic technique called secret sharing. Another well known set of protocols that uses secret sharing, is Sharemind [22] . Homomorphic encryption is another competing cryptographic technique suitable for secure computations. Table 4 reports the computational time taken by these techniques for the multiplication of matrices (B T D). The experimental setup used to generate these results is discussed in Section 4.1. We chose matrix multiplication to compare these techniques because FEA involves large number of matrix multiplications and the size of these matrices increase with the number of elements.
Homomorphic encryption involves computation over encrypted data. As the computational complexity of encryption is O(n 3 ), the time required by homomorphic encryption is high. On the other hand, secret sharing is computationally lightweight for performing computations securely but the size of the secret linearly increases with the number of collaborators. Our SAPAS protocols takes about 30% less computational time when compared with Sharemind protocols. Hence, we use SAPAS protocols in sFEA. The same computation takes approximately 12 µs when the matrices (B T and D) are openly exchanged among the collaborators. Next, we will discuss the implementation procedure of sFEA. 
Experimental Setup
The following experimental setup is used to determine the computation time. Recall that SAPAS protocols require an external server (H) to perform the computations securely. Alice, Bob, and H are simulated using different terminals on a single lap-top. For comparison purposes, a common language (Python3) is used for coding both open FEA and sFEA and the simulations (sFEA and open FEA) are performed on the same laptop under a nominal computational load. A UNIX based command, "time python3" is used to determine the computation time. Note that the computational times reported from these experiments do not include network delays as the experiments are conducted on a single laptop.
We discuss the performance of a direct implementation of FEA algorithm in the SCD framework discussed in Section 3.1.
sFEA: Naïve Approach
In the naïve approach, we use the SAPAS protocols (using MDP protocol for multiplication) for all the computations involved in the three parts mentioned in Table 2 . Table 5 shows the computational time taken by the Naïve sFEA for just two quadrilateral mesh elements. This approach imposes a very high computational overhead to preserve the confidentiality of the parameter values involved.
Another concern with the naïve sFEA approach is related to the amount of data being exchanged between Alice, Bob and H. As all the computations are performed over additive splits, it is required for Alice, Bob, and H to maintain high precision levels while sending/receiving data in order to avoid propagation of any numerical errors. This large amount of data can saturate the communication channel as the number of mesh elements increases. This acts as a constraint and limits the scalability of naïve sFEA. In the next section, we describe a few approaches to reduce the computational burden.
sFEA Hybrid
Naive sFEA imposes a high computational cost of security and this is not suitable for computationally intensive FEA simulations. In this section, we discuss different strategies that can help designers in reducing the computational overhead.
Strategy 1: Reduce communication and number of rounds
The computational time of sFEA is determined by the following three factors: (1) Communication: The amount of data that has be exchanged between Alice, Bob and H for a single computation, (2) Rounds: The number of times data needs to be exchanged between Alice, Bob and H, and (3) Computational complexity: The computational complexity of the in-house computations performed by Alice, Bob and H. In networks, the computational cost associated with communication and rounds usually supersede computational complexity. Hence, the idea is to identify the computations that can be executed in parallel. This increases communication while decreasing the number of rounds. Note that there is a saturation point for the amount of data that can be exchanged over a communication channel.
The determination of element stiffness matrix (K e ) in part 1 of the FEA algorithm involves matrix multiplication at different quadrature points. As element stiffness is a weighted combination of B T DB and the sizes of B and D are relatively small, all these matrix multiplications can be performed simultaneously. For a four-node quadrilateral element, this approach reduces the number of communication rounds by at least 3. This strategy reduced the computation time from 59.75 ms to 25.6 ms (see Figure 4) . The communication between Alice, Bob and H in the newly proposed multiplication protocol (MDP) is double to that of the multiplication protocol (MP) of the SAPAS protocol suite. So, we propose to use MDP in part 1 of the FEA algorithm and use MP protocol in part 2 and 3 of the FEA algorithm. This helps to reduce the communication between Alice, Bob and H, thereby, reducing the total computational burden imposed by sFEA. Note that the confidential information owned by Alice and Bob is embedded in the global stiffness matrix. In part 2 of the FEA algorithm, the vector inner product involves multiplication of rows in matrix L. Similarly, the confidential information involved in part 3 of the FEA algorithm is f x ,f y and this is not involved in the multiplication. So, we can conclude that the use of MP from SAPAS protocol suite will not result in direct revelation of confidential inputs owned by Alice and Bob. The security can be enhanced by deploying the execution of MP with different servers.
Strategy 2: Reveal intermediate computations
Naïve sFEA preserves the confidentiality of all the intermediate computations using SAPAS protocols. Such strictness in confidentiality may not be required in all co-design scenarios. Next, we analyze information leakage through this revelation.
Consider the inner product in the Cholesky decomposition in part 2 of the FEA algorithm (refer Table 2 ). Revealing the value of "sum" in every iteration loop provides additional information to Alice and Bob (on an average of n(n + 1) 2 times in a single sFEA simulation). Note that the global stiffness matrix (K) and its Cholesky decomposition matrix (L) are not revealed to either Alice or Bob throughout sFEA. By the end of the sFEA computation process, Alice learns the displacement vector (u). Using LL T u = f and the value of "sum" and (u,f), it is not possible to accurately determine the matrix L. Without the knowledge of L, Bob's confidential parameter (B) is secure even after revealing the value of "sum". This helps Alice and Bob in reducing the requirement for large precision that is required by Naïve sFEA. Table 6 , compares the precision requirements of Naïve sFEA and sFEA hybrid to obtain accurate FEA solutions. Figure 4 compares the computational time required by Naive sFEA and Hybrid sFEA (with Strategies 1 and 2) for a mesh configuration with just two quadrilateral elements. It is evident that this strategy reduces the computational burden by 30%.
Strategy 3:
Sparse properties of the global stiffness matrix K The choice of the mesh element and mesh numbering can provide a structure to the global stiffness matrix (K). For instance, consider a triangular mesh, as shown in Figure 5 . Note that each node (except the first and the last) is connected to two other nodes. The resulting global stiffness matrix would be a band matrix i.e., the non-zero entries in the matrix are confined to the diagonal and sub-diagonals of the matrix. In such cases, the vector inner product in the Cholesky decomposition can be executed with smaller vector sizes. Similar sparse properties of the global stiffness matrix can greatly reduce the computational load.
In the sFEA technique, Alice and Bob can learn about such sparse properties of K from the connectivity matrix (C). Such knowledge further helps designers in analyzing any indirect information leak or other forms of inferences. For instance, consider a hypothetical scenario where K is a diagonal matrix. In such cases, Alice can infer Bob's material parameters after learning the displacement vector (u). This approach of sFEA allows designers to understand and evaluate such information-related risks before participating in a collaboration. 
Scalability of sFEA
The requirement of high precision saturates the communication channel while using Naive sFEA with more than two mesh elements. So, Naïve sFEA cannot be scaled up.
For this analysis, in the problem formulation discussed in Section 3.1, Alice increases the number of mesh elements. Figure 7 shows one possible way of increasing the number of mesh elements suited for a specific application that Alice has in mind. The resulting connectivity matrix (C) from a mesh configuration is shared with Bob. Table 7 reports the computational time taken by Hybrid sFEA for different numbers of quadrilateral mesh elements. Table 3 Please note that these results are obtained by including Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 (discussed in Section 4.3). Also, the times reported in this table do not include the time taken to establish connections between Alice, Bob and H as it is common for both open FEA and sFEA. Table 8 reports the computational time taken by Hybrid sFEA for different numbers of triangular mesh elements. The Hybrid sFEA uses Strategy 2 and Strategy 3.
Discussion
The strategies discussed in Section 4.3 provide ways to reduce the computational overhead for security and also allow the sFEA to be performed for higher number of elements. However, the computational burden imposed by Hybrid sFEA is very high when compared with open FEA. This makes it unsuitable for large scale FEA. In this section, we discuss the reasons for this high cost of security and discuss alternate approaches that can be used to reduce this computational load further.
Cost of Security
Fundamentally, the computational burden of sFEA technique can be attributed to the high computation time of SAPAS protocols for multiplication (MP), inverse (Inv) and square root (Sqrt) (see Table 9 ). The computation time for matrix multiplication by SAPAS protocols is two orders of magnitude higher than the computation time required for open FEA (see Section 3.4 for more details). This computational load can be reduced if the computations are independent and can be executed in parallel. However, in FEA, the independent computations are limited. For instance, consider the steps 9 and 10 and the inner loop of Cholesky decomposition of the FEA algorithm presented in Table 2. In these computations, the input of every iteration depends on the output obtained in the previous iteration. Every inner loop in the Cholesky decomposition involves the computation of vector inner product and an inverse or square root. The computation complexity of vector inner product that involves vector of length n is O(4n) using MDP and O(2n) using MP from SAPAS protocols suite. So, for every loop in the cholesky decomposition, the computational burden is given by O(n 2 ). The complexity of Part 2 of FEA algorithm is given by O(n 3 ). Similarly, the computational complexity of Part 1 and Part 3 of FEA algorithm is given by O(n 3 ) and O(n 2 ). So, the total complexity of sFEA is O(n 3 ). Note that the communication increases as the size of additive splits being shared between Alice and Bob increases. This and the computational complexity of the SAPAS protocols are the reasons behind high computation time for Part 2 and Part 3 as noted in Tables 7 and 8 . In case of 2D FEA, the n increases by 2 for every additional node.
Execute sFEA using Multiple Servers
The modular nature of the sFEA technique allows designers to simultaneously offload computations to multiple external servers. These computations need to be independent in order to run them in parallel. For instance, in part 1 of the FEA algorithm, the determination of the stiffness matrix (K) for each element can be executed independently of each other. Similarly, in part 2 of the FEA algorithm, the inner loop in the Cholesky decomposition can be parallelized. These approaches can further reduce the computational burden imposed by sFEA. However, designers need to take into consideration the time required to connect to multiple servers while using parallel computing.
Mesh Refinement using sFEA
In sFEA, both designers Alice and Bob do not know the accuracy of the resultant displacements. In the case of open FEA, designers iteratively refine their mesh until the difference between the solutions between two consecutive iterations is smaller than a threshold. A similar approach of mesh refinement can be done in sFEA as well. This requires Alice and bob to mutually agree on the threshold and run sFEA iterations until the threshold is met.
What is the Best Information Revelation Strategy?
sFEA provides flexibility to designers about what data they intend to reveal during a collaboration. Designers can apriori evaluate the information gained by the collaborators by revealing particular data. For instance, in strategy 2 (refer Section 4.3.2), the value of the inner product is revealed to reduce the computational overhead associated with data confidentiality. Such approaches raise the following questions: How to assess the leakage risk associated with a particular information revelation? How does this information revelation pan out in multiple transactions ? Zhang et al. [23] proposed an information leakage model to analyze the information leakge associated with an information revelation. Dachowicz et al. [24] used Bayesian inference to quantify the information gained from a particular information revelation. With the help of these approaches, designers can identify the information revelation strategy that minimizes leakage of confidential information and adapt sFEA to that strategy. Further research on this aspect can help designers to choose the best strategy from available information revelation strategies and perform the FEA securely. Because such discussion is not the focus of this paper it is omitted here.
Closing Comments
Information flow between multiple design stakeholders during the product realization process is important to make design decisions. Revealing information to other collaborators may not be desirable especially when it is sensitive in nature. Designers need a way to stealthily introduce their sensitive information while running a joint analysis to make interdependent decisions. In this paper, we take a modest step towards addressing this concern. We propose a secure finite element analysis (sFEA) process that enables designers to perform the computations involved in FEA without the need to reveal their confidential information to anyone. The proposed approach is computationally lightweight, cloud-compatible and secure. The scalability of this approach requires further research in order to make it suitable for large-scale FEA applications. Different information revelation strategies are analyzed to help reduce the computational burden towards the cost of security. Further research in this direction would help designers to overcome the fear of misuse of their sensitive information in design collaborations. Overcoming such inhibitions will help designers to provide accurate information and this helps in making better design decisions.
